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I
A Guide to CriticalLegal Studies,1 written by Professor Mark Kelman of Stanford Law School, definitely has merit but will nonetheless
disappoint many. For those unfamiliar with the academic legal literature
of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, the book fails as an announced guide. At the same time, for those who are more informed, the

book does not say enough that is new. The book is grossly mistitled; no
attempt is made to initiate the novice gradually into the complexities of
critical legal theory. Professor Kelman, a very sophisticated and erudite
scholar, 2 makes the mistake of presuming that his audience will already

be familiar with the major tenets of critical legal theory. The previously
uninformed but intellectually curious prospective reader will find the
book an intimidating baptism by fire, more closely akin to total immersion than to serving as any sort of road map or guide. These readers are

better advised to explore critical legal studies literature through prior law
review articles; Professor Kelman's extensive footnotes 3 handily refer the
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B., 1972, J.D., 1976, Harvard University.
t Kenneth Wang Research Professor of Law, St. John's University (1987-1988). B.A., 1973,
Catholic University of America; M.B.A., 1977, Wayne State Univesity; J.D., 1980, University of
Detroit; L.L.M., 1982, J.S.D., 1987, Yale University. This review was generously supported by the
Kenneth Wang Research Fund.
1. M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987).
2. See, eg., Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 769; Kehnan, Comment on Hoffman and Spitzer's Experimental Law and Economics, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1037 (1985); Kelman,
Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591 (1981); Kehnan,
MisunderstandingSocial Life: A Critique of the Core Premises of "Law and Economics," 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 274 (1983); Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an
"Ideal"Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Farfrom Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REv. 831
(1979); Kelman, Time Preference and Tax Equity, 35 STAN. L. REv. 649 (1983).
3. These sources include: D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94
YALE L.J. 461 (1984); and a collection of CLS articles in 36 STAN. L. REv. 1-674 (1984). For
reviews of Kennedy's book see Bloomfield, Book Review, 45 LA. L. REv. 1329 (1985); Coles, Hierar-
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reader to several excellent background sources.
Professor Kelman expressly disavows any rehash of the ongoing
political debates in the popular press concerning the fractiousness over

CLS within legal academe, perhaps most egregious in the internecine tenure warfare afflicting Harvard Law School. 4 Furthermore, the purpose
of the book is not to introduce CLS; that has already been done in an
impressive array of law review articles, symposia and collections of essays.5 Even for the more informed readers, however, this "guide" to

CLS misses the mark. As an intellectual synthesis it is incomplete.
Rather, the reader is treated to the further elucidation of the author's

particular positions, demonstrating continuing variance with other prominent CLS writers.
Unquestionably, Kelman's writing style is academically elegant. Because Kelman uriformly chooses a sophisticated discourse, the most rad-

ical leftist wing of CLS is likely to poke fun at the perceived
pretentiousness and pomposity of the book; nonetheless Kelman is wise
chy and Transcendence (Book Review), 97 HARV. L. REV. 1487 (1984); Book Review, 82 MICH. L.
REv. 961 (1984).
The Politics ofLaw has been extensively reviewed. See Bachmann & weltchek, Book Review,
30 UCLA L. REv. 1078 (1983); Ball, Book Review, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 309 (1983); Beyleveld
& Brownsword, CriticalLegal Studies (Book Review), 47 MOD. L. REv. 359 (1984); Bohm, Book
Review, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 278 (1985); Caliman, Book Review, 8 BLACK L.J. 462
(1983); Chevigny, Book Review, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 363 (1983); Dalton, Book
Review, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 229 (1983); Deutsch, CorporateLaw as the Ideology of Capitalism
(Book Review), 93 YALE L.J. 395 (1983); Forbath, Taking Lefts Seriously (Book Review), 92 YALE
L.J. 1041 (1983); Gregory, Book Review, 1983 ARIz. ST. L.J. 205; Hartog, The Politics of The
Politics of Law (Book Review), 1984 Am. B. FOUND. REs. J. 851; Holly, Book Review, 23 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 1199 (1983); Holt, A Law Book for all Seasons: Toward a Socialist Jurisprudence
(Book Review), 14 RUTGERS L.J. 915 (1983); Kramer, Book Review, 20 NEW ENG. L. REv. 599
(1984-85); Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said Than Done (Book Review), 96 HARv. L.
REv. 1466 (1983); McKenna, Book Review, 69 A.B.A. J. 798 (1983); van den Haag, PoliticsAgainst
Law (Book Review), 82 MICH. L. REv. 988 (1984); Book Review, 48 Mo. L. REv. 849 (1983). In
addition, A Guide to CriticalLegal Studies has an outstanding separate sixty-page footnote section of
informative, very well documented sources following the text.
4. See Kennedy, Are Lawyers Really Necessary?, 14 BARRISTER 11, 12 (1987) (discussing
bitter tenure dispute at Harvard Law School over CLS-identified professors); see also Adams, ProfessorDenied Tenure at Harvardto PursueSex DiscriminationClaim. Nat'l L.J., Mar. 28, 1988, at 4,
col.1. Kingson, Harvard Tenure Battle Puts 'CriticalLegal Studies' On Trial N.Y. Times, Aug. 30,
1987, § 4, at 6, col. 1 (noting divisions over tenure of CLS faculty at the Harvard Law School);
HarvardPresidentReviews Law School Tenure Decision, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1987, at 12, col. 6
(noting that CLS is "hotly disputed among legal scholars"); HarvardScholar in Sit-In Over Tenure
Cases, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1987, at A21, col. 1 (noting divisions over tenure of CLS faculty at
Harvard Law School). For an overview, see Frug, McCarthyism and CriticalLegal Studies (Book
Review), 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 665 (1987).
5. See supra notes 3-4; see also Minority Critiques of the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297 (1987); Perspectives on CriticalLegal Studics, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 239 (1984); A Symposium of CriticalLegal Studies, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 927 (1985); Symposium
on CriticalLegal Studies, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 691 (1985).
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to ignore this anarchist/nihilist fringe strain of CLS. Fortunately, Professor Kelman does provide a very erudite, selective presentation of some
major CLS themes. On this important level, the book is a very serious
academic enterprise.
Unfortunately, the presentation is a little too selective. While the
informed reader certainly will have a fuller understanding of Professor
Kelman's own thinking, essentially little new is said. Most of the book
retraces already very familiar ground, presenting meticulous reexaminations of leading CLS pieces by Professors Duncan Kennedy 6 and Roberto Unger,7 or continuing the familiar debate with the proponents of
the Law and Economics school. While Kelman's treatment of this material is too advanced for the uninitiated, the informed reader will probably
leave the book at least somewhat dissatisfied with Kelman's failure to
break new ground. The separate sixty-page footnote section, however, is
an excellent resource and may be the most useful part of the book.
As an intellectual history, the book is premature. CLS is now beginning its embattled second decade, and has obviously taken on some of the
institutional cultural trappings of a recognized intellectual movement,
via law review articles, symposia, and now, books. Of course, these developments send interesting signals as to whether the original radical leftist potential of CLS is being diluted by the very fact of its
"establishment" as a recognized intellectual force with most of its primary (hierarchical?) white male figures occupying secure tenured professorships at elite national law schools.8
CLS will never lend itself to a uniform characterization. It would be
both simplistic and erroneous to portray it in such a fashion. But neither
has it come to full fruition as an intellectual movement. While the book
wisely is not desigued primarily as a retrospective, the book would have
been more apt a decade hence. With the advantages of greater historical
perspective and opportunity for reflection, A Guide to Critical Legal
Studies could have been more representative both as a synthesis and as
an intellectual history.
Professor Kelman spends several pages in the Introduction to state
what the book will not do. It is not a popular press update on the ongoing tenure wars that afflict several law schools, nor is it a rejoinder to
6. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685
(1976); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205 (1979).
7. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).

8. See generally Minority Critiquesofthe CriticalLegal StudiesMovement, supra note 5, at 297
(1987) (considering whether there is a place for minorities in the CLS movement and what that place

might be).
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those urging that CLS scholars be purged from law school faculties. 9

Those battles are well-publicized elsewhere. 10 The book also is not an

attempt to locate CLS within the broader trend of critical theory, identified primarily with continental philosophy and the Frankfurt school."

Professor Kelman more profitably focuses upon the specifics of the major
legal elements of critical theory. The broader critical theory has been

elucidated in other works, including some by CLS writers. Moreover,
the author does not locate CLS within broader social theory, nor does he
replay the debate whether CLS is a post-Realist response to Formalism.
Professor Kelman maintains the CLS/Realist analogy does not suffice, because the Realists were less politically conscious than are CLS
proponents. Of course, this assertion would probably surprise Realists
such as William 0. Douglas and Thurman Arnold, who left legal academics to translate Realist legal theory into practice as prominent members of Roosevelt's New Deal administration. Thus far, there has been

no remotely similar entry of CLS theorists into any national political
administration.
Finally, Kelman also decides not to explore further the deconstructive literary and linguistic techniques 12 employed by CLS. Instead, Pro9. See, e.g., Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984).
10. See supra note 4; see also Adams, CUNY Faculty, Administration Struggle over Control of
Tenure, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 1, 1988, at 4 (noting CLS related tenure struggle); Adams, ABA Accreditation Panel'sPowerBecomes Evident in Recent Cases, Nat'l LJ., Dec. 14, 1987, at 4 (noting investigation of the dismissal of four CLS-identified professors at New England Law School); Professors'
Dismissal Will Be Investigated by Bar Association, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1987, § 1, at 68, col. I
(same); Adams, Four CLS SupportersFight to Keep Teaching Positions at New England, Nat'l LI.,
Aug. 17, 1987, at 4 (reporting "skirmish" at New England School over firing of four CLS-identified
professors).
11. M. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 9.
12. For an explanation of deconstruction and its techniques see J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRiTICISM AFrER STRUCTURALISM (1982); DECONSTRUCTION & CRITICISM
(1979); Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE LI. 743 (1987).
Deconstruction, always controversial, is now deeply embarrassed as well as perennially embattled. Paul de Man, Yale University Sterling Professor of Humanities at the time of his death in 1983
and one of the modem founders of literary deconstruction, has been posthumously exposed as a proNazi and anti-Semitic racist propagandist. It is ironic, perhaps fitting, that one who taught that
language is potentially an instrument of deceit and manipulation was himself a practitioner and
devotee of Hitler's Big Lie principle. See Re-examining a Scholar, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1987, § 4, at
7, col. 3. Deconstruction in legal textual analysis had already been under assault. See, e.g., Hegland,
Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203 (1985). Deconstruction may now be a literary
fad whose time has quickly passed. Professor Allan Bloom may have delivered the coup de grice to
deconstruction in his important book, The Closing of the American Mind
Comparative literature has now fallen largely into the hands of a group of professors who
are influenced by the post-Sartrean generation of Parisian Heideggerians, in particular Derrida, Foucault and Barthes. The school is called Deconstructionism, and it is the last,
predictable, stage in the suppression of reason and the denial of the possibility of truth in
the name of philosophy. The interpreter's creative activity is more important than the text;
there is no text, only interpretation. Thus the one thing most necessary for us, the knowl-

1142

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1987:1138

fessor Kelman posits that such emphasis would be "serious
misinterpretation" 13 of CLS, although, admittedly, "[d]ebates-in the
world of literary criticism have undoubtedly had some influence on many
14
people writing CLS works."
Many readers familiar with CLS scholarship will be disappointed
with the book for not pursuing one or more of these themes. CLS is not
monolithic-Kelman recognizes that various CLS camps are forming
around the poles of academic politics, the post-Realist legacy, and deconstructive literary technique. It is odd to omit so much that is potentially
important from a purported "guide" to CLS.
Given that the book is certainly not an introduction, that it is not a
guide, and that it does not address themes that many would regard as
very important to CLS, what does the book purport to do? Fortunately,
what Professor Kelman selectively does, he does in a very astute, scholarly way. It may first be helpful to put the book in a developmental
context.
In the decade since the original January 1977 outreach letter that
began the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, much has happened.
The number of law teachers, and to a much lesser extent practitioners,
identified with CLS has grown significantly. The CLS Conference has
assumed structure, institutional coordination, and a definite, somewhat
self-conscious hierarchy of leading professors teaching at elite law
schools.
From Harvard Law School, the "Rome" of CLS and now perhaps
the "Beirut" of American legal education,1 5 Professors Duncan Kennedy, Roberto Unger, and Morton Horowitz-three of the original nine
members of the first CLS organizing committee in 1977-have
powerfully and charismatically proselytized. Professor Duncan Kennedy spent a year as a visiting professor at New England Law School in
1983. Later, in 1986, that school dismissed four CLS-identified profesedge of what these texts have to tell us, is turned over to the subjective, creative selves of
these interpreters, who say that there is both no text and no reality to which the texts
refer....

This fad will pass, as it already has in Paris.
A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 379 (1987).

While language and text can be used to deceive, language also has always been used to teach
truth; indeed, it is the incarnation of truth. See, for example, the equation of God, Truth, and the
Word in the Gospel of John.
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He
was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him was
made nothing that has been made. In him was life, and the life was the light of men.
1 John 1:4 (King James).
13. M. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 12.

14. Id. at 13.
15. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
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sors, and its accreditation may now be in jeopardy. 16
Professor Mark Tushnet, now teaching at Georgetown, is another of
the original nine members; he is among the most prolific of constitutional
theoreticians. 17 Mention must also be made of Professor David Trubek,
also of the original nine organizers. Denouncing Harvard as the
"Beruit" of American legal education,1 8 he left the school when Harvard
President Derek Bok vetoed the faculty's recommendation to grant
Trubek tenure in 1987, following Trubek's one year visit from Wisconsin
Law School.
CLS is now present at several law schools. Indeed, from the 1977
conference inception, Rutgers-Camden Law School has been a center of
CLS scholarship.1 9 Professor Randall Rosenblatt of Rutgers-Camden
was also one of the original conference organizers. At Stanford Law
School, Professor Kelman is among a strong CLS group faculty, including perhaps the first prominent law school Dean from those aligned with
CLS, Paul Brest.
The significant expansion in the number of legal academics identified with CLS and CLS representation at several law schools 2° during the
past decade has fostered a second generation of CLS scholarship. Professor Kelman, a 1976 graduate of Harvard Law School, is one of the leading "second generation" CLS scholars. He expressly acknowledges his
debt to Professor Morton Horowitz. CLS never was monolithic-and
while blood remains thicker than water, especially when CLS is under
attack, the second decade of CLS scholarship has become even more variegated, and occasionally even fractious. Likewise, as with all other intellectual movements, the second decade has witnessed differing tiers in
the quality of CLS scholarship.
In spite of the growth of the CLS movement, A Guide to Critical
Legal Studies fails to take the insights of CLS work to a broader legal
audience. It is unfortunate that Professor Kelman missed an opportunity
to reach a large potential audience of curious, nonaligned legal academics
16. See sources cited supra note 10.
17. Parker, The Past of ConstitutionalTheory--And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 224 n.5
(1981) ("Most of the 'burgeoning' so far has been in articles by one person": Professor Tushnet.) In
addition to his many articles and earlier books, Professor Tushnet is now co-author of a leading
constitutional law case book. See L. SIEDMAN, G. STONE, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTiONAL LAW (1986); see also M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRrriCAL ANALYSIS
OF CONSTIUTIONAL LAW (1988).

18. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 36.
19. See Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.. 875 (1985) (CLS article
underwritten by the Rutgers Conncil on Instructional Development and the Rutgers Research
Council and written by two professors at Rutgers-Camden).
20. Professor Duncan Kennedy estimates that "there might be 120 law teachers in the country
who have a strong identification with the Crit network." Kennedy, supra note 4, at 17.
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that could be positively influenced by CLS. So what does the book do?
First, it continues to refine certain established CLS theories from the perspective of Professor Kelman. He comparatively distinguishes his positions from those of other prominent CLS scholars. For example, he
posits that Duncan Kennedy's CLS critique is preoccupied with the liberal left, while he, Kelman, focuses his CLS scholarship upon the libertarian right. Rather than translate and demonstrate the broad utility of
these points to a wider non-CLS audience, much of the book becomes an
esoteric academic parlor game within an exclusive CLS parlor. Second,
it synthesizes some, but not all of the major CLS themes and, the closing
chapters of the book provide a basis for understanding later CLS work.
II
Professor Kelman sagely avoids an attempt to define CLS in twentyfive words or less. He recognizes that many within CLS would disagree
with his views, and he does not claim to capture the essence of CLS or of
the work of even those CLS writers he discusses. Instead, Kelman continues what he accurately sees as a core CLS purpose from its inception:
"[A] movement attempting to identify the crucial structural characteristics of mainstream legal thought as examples of something called

'liberalism.'

"21

Kelman posits that mainstream liberal thought is simultaneously afflicted by fundamental insoluble contradictions, internal repression of
those contradictions, and assignment of artificial privileged positions to
serve elites and the status quo political, social, and economic regimes.
Kelman identifies the privileged, elitist status quo that the liberal legal
order serves as "the program of a remarkably right-wing, quasi-liberta' '22
rian order.
The first three chapters of A Guide to CriticalLegal Studies are devoted to established and familiar CLS expositions of the purported core
defects of liberalism. Kelman uses landmark CLS articles, such as
Duncan Kennedy's Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication 23 to
demonstrate the fundamental contradictions liberalism poses between
rules and standards, and between intentionalism and determinism. Liberalism aspires to the objective neutrality of rules, exemplified by the
mythic aphorism that we are a government of laws, and not of people.
Kelman maintains the politics of liberalism dictate dishonest manipula21. M. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 2.
22. Id. at 4.
23. 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685 (1976).
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tion through rules, and that this liberal manipulation freezes possibilities
for progressive change and exalts the current libertarian regime.
Replaying these core CLS themes are the heart of Chapter One,
Rules and Standards. In this chapter, Kelman quotes Kennedy's core
observations at length, criticizes the familiar bifurcation between the
public and private realms, and concludes, unsurprisingly, that "[r]ules
are the opiate of the masses."'24 Kelman further maintains that doetrinalism is the death mask vainly used by liberalism to coordinate and
justify the pervasive corruption of the prevailing legal and political order.
According to Kelman, liberal doctrine is neither comprehensive nor coherent; rather, it is dead, and CLS is performing the autopsy of the liberal regime.
Chapter Two, The Subjectivity of Value, reworks these central
themes as they are presented in what Kelman acknowledges as perhaps
the seminal early CLS book, Knowledge and Politics, written by Professor Roberto Unger in 1975. Liberalism's supposed distinctions between
facts and values, between reason and desire, collapse. Ironically, the status of a "landmark classic" accorded Knowledge and Politics is shared by
many outside CLS. Yale Law School Professor Bruce Ackerman, one of
the most important liberal constitutional theorists today, and long a target of often very unfair CLS barbs, 25 has very high regard for this book in
26
particular, and for Roberto Unger's work in general.
Kelman distinguishes Unger's more ephemeral work from Kennedy's focus on unmasking liberalism's contradictions. 27 He expresses
some discomfort with aspects of both positions28 and ultimately synthesizes the positive insights of a number of commentators who critique the
fundamental subjectivity of values. "Finally, we shall see an implicit Hegelian utopianism or hope for synthesis in Unger's work that is wholly
absent in Kennedy's work, which is implicitly far more cautionary and
tragic, antiutopian in grand theoretic ambition, though by no means
more despairing, resigned, or antiutopian in its implications for daily
practice. ' 29 Kelman's prophetic observation has proved accurate. Roberto Unger, dazzling both his critics and his disciples with his new tril24. M. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 63.
25. See, eg., Freeman & Schlegel, Sex, Power and Silliness: An Essay on Ackerman's Reconstructing American Law, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 847 (1985); Frug, Book Review, 84 COLUM. L, REv.
1881 (1984) (contending message of Ackerman's book analogous to "I am the way").
26. B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 103-04 & n.32 (1984) (calling Unger's
work "the most significant theoretical text" in communitarian critical legal commentary and stating
that liberal activists "have much to learn from a serious dialogue with their critics").
27. Id. at 65.
28. Id. at 81-82.
29. Id at 66.
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ogy, Politics, a Work in Constructive Social Theory, 30 has, in fact,
continued to develop and synthesize his utopian politics.
Chapter Two is largely a comparative assessment of the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the Unger and Kennedy critiques exposing
liberalism's contradictions regarding the inherent subjectivity of values.
Whether one ascribes to Unger's utopianism or to Kennedy's more despairing view of the fundamental contradictions of liberalism, Kelman
wants to leave no doubt that liberalism's futile attempt to construct the
inherent subjectivity of value has been irrefutably revealed. 3 1
Chapter Three, Intentionalism and Determinism, completes Kelman's unmasking of liberalism's core faults. Liberalism privileges "intentionalist discourse, just as it privileges a commitment to the Rule of
Law, individualism, and value subjectivity."' 32 Kelman uses several examples from criminal layv to highlight the liberal manipulation of intentionalism over determinism, when, in fact, the liberal privileging of the
former is unwarranted. 33 As a result of these liberal false dichotomies,
persons are atomized, community is fractured, and individuals rendered
powerless.
The three middle chapters focus on the Law and Economics school,
which has been CLS's most established and formidable debating opponent in legal academia for the past decade. Kelman correctly identifies
CLS's primary foe; it is these two academic camps that are fighting the
war for the heart, soul, and future of American law.3 4 The two schools
have a virtual lock on the literature published by the major law reviews,
and they dictate most terms of legal academic discourse. Interestingly,
Kelman's book has already elicited a response from "the other side."
Richard Posner, a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit and the high priest of law and economics, has reviewed
Kelman's book. Although he believes Kelman "goes way overboard," he
admits that "[d]espite its serious flaws, it is probably the best book to
35
have emerged from the CLS movement.1
The right-wing libertarian Law and Economics Chicago school, not
the few battered liberals Kennedy is so preoccupied with, indeed control
much of legal debate. Right-wing libertarianism has ascended in the
political world during this decade and throughout the tenure of the Rea30. R. UNGER, Politics, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987). Unger's book
has already generated substantial commentary. See Symposium: Roberto Unger'sPolitics, a Work in
Constructive Social Theory, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 589 (1987).
31. M. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 84-85.
32. M. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 86.
33. Id. at 88-99.
34. Reidinger, Civil War in the Ivy, 72 A.B.A. J. 64 (1986).
35. Posner, A Manifesto for Legal Renagades, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1988, at 23, col. 4.
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gan administration. Concomitantly, Chicago school gurus have had increasing influence on the federal bench3 6 while, as of yet, there is a
conspicuous absence of any CLS-identified judges. Thus, the Law and
Economics school poses the most important intellectual threat to the
CLS political and social vision.
Aided by his substantive academic expertise in tax law, Kelman
makes an especially astute observation that the libertarian ideology of the
Law and Economics school, rather than the Tribe/Dworkin/Ackerman
version of liberalism, controls the prevailing legal order today.3 7 The
conservative political preferences of libertarian Law and Economics advocate the Lockean liberal sanctification of private property, continue to
exalt the false god of Efficiency, and perpetuate the liberal artificial bifurcation of the public and private realms.38
Kelman follows the two chapters critiquing the Law and Economics
school with a final dismissal of the deification of process, a stubborn
thirty year legacy enduring since the Hart and Sacks era of Harvard Law
School during the 1950s. The legal process school has perniciously seduced society with the illusion of efficacious federalism. In reality, Kelman's counter-assertion reveals in federalism a spectre of totalitarianism.
Is federalism ineluctably drawn into central statism? According to Kelman, indicting both CLS and non-CLS legal theoreticians:
One might guess that the mainstream theorists have unconsciously
fixed on a clash of insignificant sovereignties to avoid facing the pain of
the irreconcilability of real clashes: the exaggerated tribute to localism
and diversity can be sustained only when no significant local power
exists to be exercised, for real local power
tends either to be norma39
tively perilous or factually short-lived.
Although Kelman's insights are frequently incisive, the first twothirds of the book offers nothing new. While they do not replay the debate between the major representative CLS writers, the six chapters
merely synthesize their pertinent leading works without much innovative
analysis. Kelman's tax law expertise enhances the critique of the Law
and Economics school, but there is little that the reader already ac36. See, eg., Wilson, Constraintsof Power: The ConstitutionalOpinions ofJudges Scalia, Bork,
Posner,Easterbrook and Winter, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1171, 1176-77 (1986) (Judges Posner and

Winter are "strongly attached to the libertarian values of the marketplace," and Easterbrook is "a
strong advocate of the use of economics in the law."); Wilson, Justice Diffused: A Comparison of
Edmund Burke's Conservatism with the Views of Five Conservative,Academic Judges, 40 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 913, 958 (1986) (Easterbrook has supplemented Posner's and Bork's assumptions that
"judges should defer to the market and to the text or history of laws."); Middleton, Shaping a Circuit
in the Chicago School Image, Nat'l L.J., July 20, 1987, at 1.
37. M. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 114.
38. Id. at 151-53.
39. Id. at 212.

1148

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol 1987:1138

quainted with the CLS and the Law and Economics literature could have
not previously gleaned from the pertinent articles.
The closing chapters are more interesting and provocative. Chapter
Seven, Visions of History, begins to put more CLS work into perspective.
Concentrating on the uses of intellectual history and of legal history, the
liberal manipulations of law, politics, and economics are more fully exposed. For example, the original intent constitutional theory of Attorney
General Meese 4° is unmasked as a transparent component of the rightwing libertarian agenda designed to preserve the privileged position of
the prevailing elites.
Kelman also posits that liberalism exalts a privileged mythic past as
a normative Golden Age, coincidentally consonant with the expansion of
laissez-faire corporate power. CLS counters this with a vision of history
that is indeterminate and contingent and that cries out for the community to take control of its own destiny. Liberalism also puts the nation on
the "historical bandwagon.1 4 1 Ineluctable progress and optimism are the
liberal order of the day, seeking to steamroll the contingent, indeterminate, more realistic history and politics of life, and of CLS.
Alternatively, liberalism seeks to transcend history by promulgating
the artifice of timeless absolutes and universal rules and principles. CLS
resists this revisionist antihistory. In fact, Kelman posits that there are
no absolutes for CLS. CLS denies universals. The Framers were elitist,
slave-owning or endorsing, propertied white males, hardly representative
of the collective, then or now. The liberal advocacy of timeless legal
universals is a sham with a transparent political purpose. 42
Chapter Eight discusses various CLS views on the role of law. In
many ways, this chapter is a synopsis of the prior two chapters and sets
the stage for the final chapter, Toward a Cognitive Theory of Legitimation. Epistemology and history both remain very important to CLS.
Professor Laurence Tribe, the premier conventional liberal academic of
44
his generation, 43 has dismissed the legitimacy debate as a waste of time.
CLS, on the other hand, considers the question of legitimacy to be an
important one. In the final chapter, Kelman shows how CLS has ex40. Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REv. 979 (1987).
41. See M. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 222-28.
42. See d at 229.
43. For a discussion of Professor Tribe's illustrious career as an academic and a Supreme Court
advocate, see Gregory, Book Review, 60 TUL. L. REv. 437 (1985).
44. L. TRIBE, CONSTrrUnONAL CHoicEs 3 (1985). ("Saying anything at all about how constitutional choices in general might be validated as 'legitimate' even if controversial seems nearly pointless these days.... When it comes to legitimacy, all has been said already, and what has been said is
all so deeply riddled with problems that it seems hardly worth restating, much less refuting or
refining.").
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posed the legitimacy strategies of mainstream thought. 45 He outlines and
critiques various devices liberalism has used to legitimate itself: reification, exaltation of the atomized individual and denial of the contradictions within liberal law.
For example, Kelnan focuses on the analytic conventions of Wesley
46
Hohfeld to highlight liberalism's "synthetic individualist" tradition.
Tort and contract law recognize the duty to refrain from causing harm,
but not the at least equally compelling affirmative duties to help others
and to render aid. 47 Why are liberal rights incoherent, Kelman rhetorically asks. Ultimately, the CLS unmasking of these deep anomalies will
reveal an insoluble contradiction in liberal legal theory that gives children the right not to be molested, but not public rights to adequate food,
48
clothing and shelter in the private law liberal regime.
Kelman maintains that by denying its own deep, inherent contradictions, liberalism has anesthetized legal consciousness. 4 9 The transformative potential of law is thus vitiated by the status quo universalism and
misguided utopianism of liberalism.50 CLS seeks to restore both reality
and critical ability by revealing that the pathology of liberalism renders
everyone "shallow, status-oriented goods junkies."5 1 Ultimately, Kelman believes CLS will unpackage the liberal constellation of pernicious
and supposedly unproblematic myth systems. Kelnan concludes that
traditional mainstream legalist practice "makes us passive by making us
confused. The critics try to retrace, hoping to see where we first got
lost."5 2
These final three chapters are by far the most powerful. They simultaneously offer the only semblance of a "guide" to those previously unfamiliar with CLS work, and more importantly, they coordinate important
themes for future CLS work. In particular, these chapters provide an
excellent springboard for a better understanding of Roberto Unger's
most recent work.5 3 Unfortunately, despite its unfailing thoughtfulness
and considerable academic worth, A Guide to CriticalLegal Studies is
much less than what it should have been. The book is a sophisticated
spin on CLS theory among, by, and for colleagues primarily within CLS.
45. M. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 269.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id at 279-84.
Id at 279.
See id. at 280-82.
Id at 286.
Id at 290.
Id. at 292.
Id. at 295.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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Of course, there is nothing objectionable with this scope, and much that
is valuable. Undeniably, the book has synthetic merit.
Nonetheless, after a decade of growing CLS literature, and five years
after The Politicsof Law, the time is ripe for a CLS book that positively
reaches, and is readily accessible to, a broader legal audience. Even CLS
colleagues, comfortable with heavy polysyllabic jargon, occasionally may
be thrown by the frequent paragraph-length sentences.
Kelman's writing style, always scholarly, need not be so convoluted.
In fact, it may confirm the simplistic dismissals of CLS by its many opponents on grounds of dense, convoluted, inaccessible stylistics alone. Examples abound. Important points can be sabatoged by the author's style
as the eyes glaze over.
The claim, then, that "legalism" blocks transformative, counter
hegemonic thought can only mean that the particularsubstantive reifying practices associated with our legal culture have a particnlar capacity to block thought of specific transformative programs and/or
that the usual legal technique or procedure of reification itself sohdifies
politically conservative practice. 5 4

As Duncan Kennedy puts it so aptly, "Like wow, man!"55 Most nonCLS readers, if they make it to page 270, will understandably be much
less charitable in their assessment of Kelman's convoluted stylistics.
Although Professor Kelman's book is somewhat disappointing, his
work has considerable merit. For what Kelman does, he does very well.
He elucidates, rather than replays, several important aspects of CLS internal debates. The chapters devoted to comparative assessments of Law
and Economics, and the closing chapters' treatment of history and ideology are especially thoughtful.
A Guide to CriticalLegal Studies, while less than what one would
have expected from the title, is certainly more than nothing. For any
serious lawyer or academic interested instaying abreast of always controversial and occasionally innovative legal theory, and regardless of the
reader's personal politics, -this new book can provide considerable food
for thought-and perhaps even some nourishment.

54. M. KELMAN, supra note 1, at 270.
55. Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction. 130 U. PA. L. REv.
1349, 1354 (1982) (explaining "loopification" of one's conciousness).

